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KIRK GARDNER,

*

Plaintiff/Appellant,

*
*

vs.
PERRY CITY and BRAD WILKINSON,

*

Case No. 990080-CA

*

Priority No. 15

*

Defendants/Appellees

*

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-22(3)0) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE LAWS
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-401 (1953 as amended):
The legislative body may enact a zoning ordinance establishing regulations for
land use and development that furthers the intent of this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-402 (1953 as amended):
(1)
The planning commission shall prepare and recommend to the legislative
body a proposed zoning ordinance, including both the full text of the zoning ordinance
and maps, that represents the commission's recommendations for zoning all or any
part of the area within the municipality.
(2)
(a)
The legislative body shall hold a public hearing on the proposed
zoning ordinance recommended to it by the planning commission.
(b)
The legislative body shall provide reasonable notice of the public
hearing at least 14 days before the date of the hearing. If a municipality mails notice
of a proposed zoning change to property owners within that municipality within a
specified distance of the property on which the zoning change is being proposed, it
1

shall also mail equivalent notice to property owners of an adjacent municipality within
the same distance of the property on which the zoning change is being proposed.
(3) After the public hearing, the legislative body may:
(a)
adopt the zoning ordinance as proposed;
(b) amend the zoning ordinance and adopt or reject the zoning
ordinance as amended; or
(c)
reject the ordinance.
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-403 (1953 as amended):
(1)

(a)

The legislative body may amend:
(i) the number, shape, boundaries, or area of any zoning district,
(ii) any regulation of or within the zoning district; or
(iii) any other provision of the zoning ordinance,
(b) The legislative body may not make any amendment authorized by
this subsection unless the amendment was proposed by the planning commission or is
first submitted to the planning commission for its approval, disapproval or
recommendations.
(2)
The legislative body shall comply with the procedure specified in Section
10-9-402 in preparing and adopting an amendment to the zoning ordinance or the
zoning map.
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-1001 (1953 as amended):
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use
decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made under authority of this
chapter until that person has exhausted his administrative remedies.
(2) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise of
the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the
district court within
30 days after the local decision is rendered.
(3) The courts shall:
(a)
presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal.
Perry City Database 2.3, Procedure for Zone Change Amendment:
1.
The Planning Commission shall review the Zone Change Amendment
Application and submit its recommendations in writing concerning the proposed
amendment to the City Council within thirty (45) [sic] days from receipt of the
amendment application. If the Planning Commission fails to make a recommendation
2

at the end of forty-five (45) days, it shall be presumed that the proposed amendment is
recommended for approval by the Planning Commission and the City Council shall
then take action.
The Planning Commission shall recommend adoption of a proposed zone
change amendment where the following findings are made:
a.
The proposed amendment is in accord with the goals of the Master
Plan of Perry City.
b.
Changed or changing conditions make the proposed amendment
reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of this ordinance.
c.

The proposed amendment does not represent spot zoning.

2.
After receipt of the written recommendations of the Planning
Commission for rezoning or annexation, the City Council shall give notice of a public
hearing, to be advertised for at least 15 days to consider such amendment as provided
by law for zoning amendments. Written notification of this public hearing to consider
rezoning or annexation amendments shall be mailed by certified mail to all property
owners within three hundred (300) feet of the property proposed for rezoning or
annexation.
3.
After the required public hearing has been held on the proposed
amendment, the City Council may adopt or reject such amendment or annexation.
4.
If the City Council proposes to make any change in the amendment as
submitted to it by the Planning Commission, or as advertised, it shall refer such
change back to the Planning Commission and the procedure shall start over at Step 1.
5.
Where an application for zoning amendment has been denied, any
resubmitted application shall be processed in accordance with the procedure outlined
above.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiff alleges that the Perry City Council violated state statute and local
ordinance by voting to approve rezones for various properties incrementally, after
separating the properties out from a 245 acre block that had been approved for rezone
3

by the Perry Planning Commission. Wilkinson argues that the relevant state statute,
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-402, not only allows the action taken by the City Council, but
grants the City power to take much broader actions than the action taken in this
matter.
Furthermore, the City Council's action in deliberating on rezone approvals for
separate properties incrementally did not constitute a "change" in the Planning
Commission's rezone recommendation, and thus did not require the City Council to
obtain Planning Commission approval of the City Council's actions, as might
otherwise have been required by the ordinance. The City Council debated the proper
interpretation of the ordinance prior to taking its action, and determined that its action
fairly fell within the requirements of the ordinance. The City's interpretation of its
ordinance is reasonable, justified, and is the best evidence of the legislative intent of
the ordinance. Thus, the City's ordinance interpretation should be upheld. However,
the local ordinance itself must be invalidated to the extent that it limits and prohibits
the City Council from exercising powers which are specifically granted to it in the
zoning ordinance enabling statute, Utah Code Ann. §10-9-402.
The court lacks jurisdiction of Plaintiffs claim that the Wilkinson Subdivision
approval is illegal, because Plaintiff has failed to file its appeal petition in District
Court within 30 days of Perry City subdivision decision, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§10-9-1001.

4

Plaintiffs request for reinstatement of the Lis Pendens should be denied.
Furthermore, because Plaintiff has failed to file a motion for stay, any reinstatement
of the Lis Pendens would only apply to unsold subdivision lots. Thus, overturning the
City's land use decision would lead to an undesirable checkerboard result, with some
subdivision lots being subject to the outcome of litigation, while others would not be.
Such a result would violate proper land use policies.
Finally, even if the court rules that the City's actions were illegal, there is
sufficient record evidence for the court to uphold the City's decision for lack of
prejudice to Plaintiff, given that the Planning Commission has unanimously expressed
its approval of the Wilkinson rezone.
ARGUMENT
I.

PERRY'S FEBRUARY 26, 1998 REZONING DECISION DID NOT
VIOLATE THE STATE ZONING ENABLING STATUTE.

The statutory requirements for planning commission participation in rezone
decisions pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §10-9-402 and §10-9-403, are much less
restrictive than the corresponding Perry City ordinance. Section 10-9-403(2) requires
that the legislative body "shall" comply with §10-9-402 procedures when adopting an
amendment to the zoning ordinance or zoning map. The procedure outlined in §10-9402(3) provides that, after planning commission review and public hearing, the
legislative body may: (a) adopt the rezone, (b) amend the rezone, and then adopt or
reject the amended rezone, (c) or reject the rezone.

5

Ironically, of the three procedural paths provided to the City Council by §10-9402(3), remand to the Planning Commission is not even a option. The Planning
Commission is an advisory body to the legislative body. Utah Code Ann. §10-9-204.
It's role in rezoning is to propose rezoning amendments or to approve, disapprove or
make recommendations on rezone proposals, §10-9-403(l)(b), and then send its
advisory recommendations to the legislative body. §10-9-402(1). Armed with these
recommendations, the legislative body holds a public hearing, §10-9-402(2), and
makes a final determination of the language and provisions of the rezone ordinance,
and whether to accept or reject the rezone. §10-9-402(3). Perry City's decision to
deliberate on the recommended zone changes incrementally or separately, without
obtaining permission from the advisory body, falls well within the legislative body's
broad rezoning powers granted by §10-9-402 and §10-9-403.l
H.

THE ACTIONS OF THE PERRY CITY COUNCIL DID NOT
VIOLATE THE CITY'S ZONING ORDINANCE.
A.

Plaintiff Presents a Spurious Fact Issue which Was NonExistent At the Trial Court Level.

At the bottom of page 14 of his Appellate Brief, Plaintiff makes a fact
allegation which is unsupported by the record: that the City Council rezoned some
property which was never included in the Planning Commission recommendation.

1

Pursuant to Rule 24(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Wilkinson adopts by
reference the arguments set forth Perry City's Appellate Brief, p. 5-12, as additional
support for the statutory compliance arguments set forth herein.
6

This allegation was first raised by Plaintiff at the Summary Judgment hearing, and was
the basis of several probing questions from the court and Wilkinson's counsel as to
whether there any evidence to support such an allegation. See Hearing Transcript, R.
205, at 23-28. After much discussion regarding Plaintiffs speculations on the matter,
and assurances from the Perry City Clerk attending the hearing that Plaintiffs
speculations were unfounded, Plaintiff conceded that all Property rezoned was part of
the 245 acres for which public notice was given after the Planning Commission made
its recommendation. R. 205, Page 28, Lines 6-7.
This concession is important because Plaintiffs own statement of fact alleges
that "[o]n January 21, 1998, The Perry City Planning Commission recommended to
the Perry City Council a rezoning of 245 acres to an "Rl" zone." R. 50, Fact
Statement No. 5. The Planning Commission minutes also refer to the proposed zone
change as consisting of 245 acres. See R. 71, last paragraph. If Plaintiff alleges that
the Planning Commission approved a zone change of 245 acres, and concedes that
public notice was given regarding a proposed zone change for 245 acres and that all
rezoned property was part of the 245 acres notice area, there are simply no record
facts upon which to allege that the City Council rezoned property which was not part
of the Planning Commission's Recommendation.2

2

Plaintiffs speculation is based on a obscure passage from the City Council Hearing,
in which the City approved of rezoning particular properties, "[t]o include all islands and
peninsulas not attached to the petition." R. 150, Last Paragraph. This is appropriate,
since the content of the original petition does not limit the Planning Commission or the
7

Plaintiff has failed to provide any admissible evidence tending to prove that
property was rezoned which was not included in the Planning Commission
Recommendation. Furthermore, the only time Plaintiff ever raised speculations about
this issue, he conceded facts which lead to an opposite conclusion. It was based on
Plaintiffs stated facts and concessions of facts at the hearing, that the court concluded
at the hearing that "[t]he facts were stipulated to so this matter is proper for a ruling
on a motion for summary judgment." Hearing Transcript, R. 205, Page 36, Lines 2324. Plaintiff may not raise new issues of fact on appeal, which were conceded and
stipulated to at the trial court.
B.

No "Change" Was Made To The Petition During The
February 26, 1998 Meeting Which Required A Referral Back
To The Planning Commission.

The power of a city to zone and regulate land use is a legislative function
specifically delegated by statute to cities. Utah Code Ann. §10-9-401 (1998). Court
oversight of zoning and land use legislation is very limited:
The Court shall:
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal.
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-1001(3) (1998).

City Council in the breadth of their zoning decision. However, there is nothing in this
quoted language which requires the conclusion that, ipso facto, the City Council rezoned
property not included in the Planning Commission's recommendation.
8

Utah courts have determined that the statutory presumption of validity requires
the upholding of zoning regulations and decisions, unless the court can find no
reasonable basis justifying their validity:
It is well established in Utah that courts of law cannot substitute their
judgment in the area of zoning regulations for that of the [municipality's]
governing body. Instead, the courts afford a comparatively wide latitude
of discretion to administrative bodies charged with the responsibility of
zoning, as well as endowing their actions with the presumption of
correctness and validity, because of the complexity of factors involved in
the matter of zoning and the specialized knowledge of the administrative
body. Thus, the courts will not consider the wisdom, necessity, or
advisability or otherwise interfere with the zoning determination unless it
is shown that there is no reasonable basis to justify the action taken.
Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482, 486-87 (Utah App.
1990)(citations omitted).
The presumption of validity, while intended to be a significant barrier to
overturning legislative/administrative decisions of cities, is not absolute or boundless.
For example, if a city makes a land use decision in clear contravention of its own
ordinances, the decision may be overturned for illegality. See Springville Citizens v.
City of Springville, 365 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 1999 Utah Lexis 28, 18 (Utah 1999);
Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440, 445-46 (Utah 1981). A review of the
Springville Citizens case is helpful to show the difference between lawful and illegal
land use decisions.
In Springville Citizens, which has some superficial similarities to the case
before the court, the Springville City Council, among other things, modified a PUD to
include nine new conditions, and then approved the PUD without first remanding it be

9

reviewed by the Planning Commission. Id. at 10. The Council's action was in clear
contravention of a city ordinance which required that if modifications are required by
the city council, such modifications "must" first be reviewed by the Planning
Commission. Id. Furthermore, the words "must" and "shall" as used in this and
other violated ordinances were explicitly defined in Springville ordinances as
designating mandatory actions. At trial and on appeal, the city argued that while it
admittedly violated the remand provision of the ordinance, as well as several other
ordinances, there was "substantial compliance" with the city's ordinances. Id. at 17.
The court rejected this argument, observing that while substantial performance may be
sufficient for discretionary actions, the city had itself removed any discretion it might
have otherwise had, by enacting ordinances which used language specifically defined
to be mandatory. Id. at 16-17. Given that the meaning of the ordinances were clearly
defined, the city could not "change the rules halfway through the game." Id.
The facts presented in this case are quite different from those in Springville
Citizens. Unlike the Springville Citizens example, there is a significant issue of
interpretation of a City ordinance in the present case, which cannot be resolved by
mere reference to legislative definitions. Furthermore, unlike the majority of the
reported cases where ordinances are inadvertently violated, and then minimalized or
re-interpreted later by the violating party, Perry City engaged in a substantial debate
regarding the interpretation of its own ordinance prior to taking the action which
Plaintiff contends is unlawful.

to

While a transcript is not a available of the February 26, 1998 Perry City
Council meeting in which the zone change approval was granted, minutes of the
meeting reveal that there was much deliberation and discussion regarding why the
proposed zone change amendment needed to be passed in an incremental or separate
fashion, and whether such action comported with the Perry City zone change
amendment ordinance. See Minutes of February 26, 1998, R. 150. Councilman
Carol Billings proposed that properties recommended for zone change be separated out
and then voted on for zone changes. R. 150. Councilman Desmond Thomas moved
to act on the Wilkinson zone change as a separate item because Wilkinson had a
development plan. R. 150. Councilman Pettingill, while supporting the incremental
approach to zone changes, argued that to do so without remanding to the Planning
Commission would violate the City's zone change amendment ordinance. R. 150.
However, the Council's disagreement with Councilman Pettingill's interpretation was
made clear when there was no second for his motion to refer the zone change back to
the planning commission. R. 150. Councilman Bruce Payne argued that separating
out certain property within the zone change amendment petition for approval did not
violate existing law, including the city's ordinance. R. 150 Councilman Payne
further argued that the ordinance was intended to prevent the council from changing
the recommended zone designation for any of the properties without remand, but, that
it did not prevent incremental approval of the properties. R. 150. The majority of
the counsel also interpreted the ordinance in the same manner as Councilman Payne,
11

therefore, the Council approved Wilkinson's zone change (4-1), with Councilman
Pettingill registering the sole dissenting vote. R. 150.
Where legislative "language is plain and unambiguous, it must be held to mean
what it expresses, and no room is left for construction." Board of Education v. Salt
Lake City, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1989). In this case, Plaintiff argues that the
"any change" language in the remand provision of Perry City Ordinance 2.3, plainly
and unambiguously prevented the City Council from deliberating on the large, 245
acre re-zoning recommendation in an incremental fashion. However, the word
"change" is not defined in the ordinance, and is subject to the reasonable interpretation
of the same governing body which enacted the ordinance. Indeed, it is difficult to
fathom how Plaintiffs interpretation is the only plain and unambiguous meaning,
when the majority of the governing body understood and interpreted the ordinance to
have a different meaning than Plaintiff did, even after the issue was fairly debated
prior to voting.
Courts often look to administrative interpretation and practice of the body
taking action to find a proper meaning of the statute or ordinance in question. Salt
Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738 (Utah 1977); Condas v. Salt Lake
County, 295 P.2d 829 (Utah 1956). In this case, the governing body which
interpreted the ordinance is the same legislative body that has ultimate authority to
enact, repeal or amend all city ordinances, including the ordinance which Plaintiff

12

seeks to interpret to his favor. The city's governing body is in the best position to
interpret its own zoning ordinance.
Upholding the legislature's specified intent is the hallmark of the court rules of
construction for statutes and ordinances:
To resolve conflicts in interpretation of statutes or ordinances, we look to wellsettled rules of statutory construction. First, in cases of apparent conflict
between provisions of the same statute, it is the Court's duty to harmonize and
reconcile statutory provisions, since the Court cannot presume that the
legislature intended to create conflict. Further, a provision treating a matter
specifically prevails over an incidental reference made thereto in a
provision treating another issue, not because one provision has more force
than another, but because the legislative mind is presumed to have stated
its intent when it focused on that particular issue, (citations omitted)
Bennion v. Sundance Development Corp., 897 P.2d 1232, 1236 (Utah 1995).
While there is no evidence that the City Council deliberated on the narrow issue of
incremental passage of zone changes recommendations when it initially enacted its
procedural zone change amendment ordinance, there is substantial legislative history
demonstrating that the legislative mind was focused on this issue when it adopted the
Wilkinson rezone.3 The specific treatment of this issue in its recent amendment to

3

It is significant that the governmental action required in a zone change is
enactment of a legislative amendment of the zoning ordinance, Utah Code Ann.§ 10-9401, et seq., rather than some administrative action, approval, permit, or variance, as in
Springville Citizens. The re-zone ordinance enacted has the same legislative stature as
the procedural ordinance which governed its enactment. Furthermore, the re-zone
ordinance is the most focused manifestation of legislative intent on the issue raised by
Plaintiff, and must be construed so as to not conflict with other ordinances, where
possible. Bennion v. Sundance Development Corp., 897 P.2d 1232, 1236 (Utah 1995).
13

the zoning ordinance is a clear expression of legislative intent regarding interpretation
of its zone change amendment ordinance.
Finally, Plaintiff cannot prevail in this matter by merely arguing that Plaintiffs
interpretation is better or more persuasive than Perry City's interpretation. Rather,
the test for determining the validity of the City's land use decisions is whether "there
is no reasonable basis to justify the action taken." Sandy City v. Salt Lake County,
794 P.2d 482, 486-87 (Utah App. 1990). Plaintiff presents numerous arguments as to
why the interpretation of the majority of the governing body should be supplanted by
his own interpretation or the interpretation of the minority of the City Council.
However, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there is no reasonable basis to justify
the City's actions. Id. Therefore, the city's actions must be upheld.
C.

Appellant's Interpretation Of The Perry Ordinance Would Be
A Violation of Utah Code Ann. §10-9-402 And §10-9-403 And
Must Therefore Be Rejected.

Wilkinson adopts by reference the arguments set forth in Perry City's Appellate
Brief, p. 16-18, pertaining to conflicts between the zoning enabling statute and Perry
City's zone change amendment ordinance. Additionally, Wilkinson supplements the
arguments set forth of the Perry City Brief with the following observations.
Utah Code Ann. §10-9-401, enables a municipal legislative body to enact a
zoning ordinance "that farthers the intent of this chapter." Section 10-9-403
specifically provides that after the planning commission has made its recommendations
on a proposed rezone and the legislative body has held public hearing, the legislative
14

body may amend the rezone and then adopt or reject the amended rezone. §10-9403(3)(b). Nevertheless, Perry City's Database Ordinance 2.3, paragraphs 3-4,
purports to deny the legislative body the power to amend, then adopt or reject the
amended ordinance:
3.
After the required public hearing has been held on the proposed
amendment, the City Council may adopt or reject such amendment or
annexation.
4.
If the City Council proposes to make any change in the
amendment as submitted to it by the Planning Commission, or as advertised, it
shall refer such change back to the Planning Commission and the procedure
shall start over at Step 1.
In comparing the City's ordinance to the enabling statute, Paragraph 3 permits the
legislative body to take the actions allowed by §10-9-402(3)(a) ("adopt the zoning
ordinance as proposed") and §10-9-402(3)(c) ("reject the ordinance"). However,
Paragraph 4 of the ordinance specifically prohibits the legislative body from taking the
action allowed by the statute pursuant to § 10-9-402(3)(B) ("amend the zoning
ordinance and adopt or reject the zoning ordinance as amended"). Contrary to the
enabling statute, under the Ordinance, a rezone amendment cannot be proposed, voted
on, and approved by the City Council. If the City Council proposes an amendment
pursuant to the Ordinance Paragraph 4, it is the equivalent of a rejection of the rezone
pursuant to Paragraph 5, because either action requires petitioner to start the process
over again at the Planning Commission. See Para.4 and 5, Perry City Ordinance 2.3.
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By explicitly forbidding legislative action which is specifically allowed under
the zoning enabling statute, the Perry City Ordinance fails to "further the intent" of
the zoning enabling statute, §10-9-401, but rather violates and conflicts with the
statute. As set forth in authorities extensively cited by Perry City in its Appellate
Brief, the Perry City Ordinance must be held to be invalid to the extent that it
conflicts with specific statutory provisions.4
III.

PLAINTIFF IS TIME-BARRED FROM ALLEGING INVALIDITY
OF WILKINSON SUBDIVISION APPROVAL.

Plaintiff has failed to contest the Wilkinson Subdivision approval within 30 days
of Perry City's final approval of the subdivision as required by Utah Code Ann §10-91001(2). Therefore, Plaintiffs cause of action for invalidating the subdivision
approval is jurisdictionally barred.
Plaintiff filed his original Complaint against Perry City on March 30, 1998,
alleging only that the rezone ordinance was invalid. R. 20. Wilkinson was not named
as a party, nor was Wilkinson's subdivision approval at issue, in the original
Complaint. R. 20. On May 28, 1998, the Perry City Council granted final approval
of the Wilkinson Subdivision, by unanimous vote. R. 98 and R. 10. On June 30,

4

It is important to point out that the planning commission remand provision in
Springville Citizens, was not a zoning issue controlled by the same statute as is controlling
in this case. Nor was the statutory validity of the remand ordinance ever raised in
Springvile Citizens. Thus, the Supreme Court's implicit approval of the remand
ordinance existing in that case provides no precedent whatsoever to the statutory conflict
issues raised in this case.
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1998, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, which for the first time named Wilkinson
as a party and claimed that the Wilkinson Subdivision approval was invalid. R. 1.
See Court Docket. However, the Amended Complaint was filed more than thirty
days after subdivision approval.
While the 30 day limitation of Utah Code Ann §10-9-1001(2) was not raised at
the trial court, it is a jurisdictional statute. Herr v. Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d 728,
730 (Utah 1974) (appeal time period imposed in land use legislation is jurisdictional).
Jurisdictional issues may be raised and adjudicated for the first time on appeal. In re
Adoption ofB.O., 927 P.2d 202, 206 ( Utah App. 1996); Wilde v. Union Pacific, 84
P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1938); Allen v. Gardner, 143 P. 228, 230 (Utah 1914);
Golding v. Jennings, 1 Utah 135, 139 (Utah 1874). Therefore, the jurisdictional issue
is properly before this court.
Plaintiff, perhaps anticipating the 30 day issue, argues that by filing its initial
Complaint against the city regarding the zone change ordinance, its has "preserve[d]
effectual control of the judiciary over a decision to invalidate the rezone and all of it
logical extensions." See Plaintiffs Appellate Brief at p. 18. In essence, Plaintiff
argues that the City must stop transacting business regarding the rezoned property, or
that all subsequent City decisions will be subject to invalidation, pending the outcome
of Plaintiffs suit. However, Plaintiff cites no legal authority for such a proposition.
The City's approval of the Wilkinson Subdivision and enactment of the rezone
ordinance were separate and distinct governmental decisions. Utah Code Ann §10-917

1001(2) requires that "any person adversely affected by a decision" must file a petition
for review of the decision within 30 days after the decision is rendered. Id. Because
Plaintiff failed to file an appeal petition within 30 days of the subdivision decision,
Wilkinson has a vested right in the validity of the subdivision approval.
Plaintiff is expected to argue that an allegedly defected rezone makes
subdivision approval inherently defective whether or not Plaintiff timely filed its
appeal. However, there is no support for this proposition in the appeal statute.
Zoning is only one of numerous considerations and procedures necessary to be
followed in approving a subdivision. See generally Utah Code Ann. §10-9-801 et.seq.
The very purpose of the of the 30 day statute is to prevent invalidity suits, unless the
Plaintiff acts quickly. It does not matter whether Plaintiff alleges the subdivision
decision is invalid because of zoning defects or any other procedural or substantive
defect, the subdivision decision will be final and unalterable unless Plaintiff complies
with the §10-9-1001 requirement to file his appeal petition within 30 days of the
decision.
Moreover, Plaintiffs interpretation of the 30 day rule would render the statute
meaningless. After all, the Wilkinson property consists of a only a small portion of
the total acreage which was rezoned on May 28, 1998 by the Perry City Council; yet,
Wilkinson was the only landowner which Plaintiff has sued or filed a Lis Pendens
against. If the court accepts Plaintiffs theory that by merely suing the City regarding
the rezone, that all future subdivision decisions are under the court's control, absurd
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results would follow. Particularly, all other landowners who have obtained
subdivision approval in the rezoned area, or may in the future obtain subdivision
approval in the rezoned area, are subject to having the city's subdivision approval
invalidated, regardless of whether Plaintiff brings suit against such landowners within
30 days or 30 months of the City's subdivision approvals. Such an interpretation
would render the 30 day limitation of §10-9-1001 meaningless, and thus is ineffective
as an excuse to Plaintiffs failure to comply with the 30 day rule.
Plaintiff is also expected to argue that he nevertheless complied with §10-91001(2), by filing his petition within 30 days of Wilkinson's recording of the
subdivision plat. However, the mere recording of the subdivision plat is an action to
be carried out by the landowner, not the city, and does not require a new or additional
vote or decision by the city council. See Utah Code Ann. §10-9-804(3). It is the
subdivision final approval, not that recording of the plat, that constitutes the governing
body's decision. The timing of Wilkinson's recording of the plat is not a city
decision which is subject to appeal. Thus, bringing suit within 30 days of plat
recordation does not satisfy the requirement of bringing a petition "within 30 days
after the local decision is rendered." Utah Code Ann. §10-9-1001(2).
Plaintiff also argues that because he notified the City and Wilkinson of his
initial Complaint against the City, prior to the subdivision approval, that the
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subdivision approval is somehow barred.5 However, the sending of demand letters
o^ notices to potential litigants does not meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann.
§10-9-1001(2). Rather, Plaintiff must timely file a petition contesting the local
decision in District Court. Id. Indeed, the fact that Plaintiff took the time to replead
his Complaint after the subdivision decision, to include arguments that the subdivision
approval was illegal, suggests that Plaintiff well understood the necessity to make a
claim regarding the subdivision approval, in order to preserve his position.
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs Amended Complaint was simply too late to meet the
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §10-9-1001.
Wilkinson's subdivision approval is valid and vested and Plaintiffs allegations
of invalidity are time-barred.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER RELEASING THE LIS PENDENS
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. REINSTATEMENT OF LIS PENDENS
WOULD ONLY AFFECT UNSOLD PROPERTIES.

At the summary judgment hearing of this matter, the court granted Wilkinson's
request that Plaintiffs Lis Pendens be released. See Hearing Transcript, R. 205, p.
37. This ruling was incorporated into the Judgment, and served upon Plaintiff for
review. R. 180-183. The Judgment was entered without timely objection from
Plaintiff.

5

The City was never served with the original Complaint. The City was served with
the Amended Complaint on July 8, 1999. R. 32. Wilkinson was never actually served
with the Amended Complaint, but waived service by filing his Answer to the Amended
Complaint on July 29, 1998. R. 28.
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The court of appeals is empowered to make an independent determination of the
correctness of the trial court's lis pendens release at the time of granting Judgment:
"[w]hether a court may grant a party's requested relief from a lis pendens is a
question of law which an appellate court reviews for correctness, according no
deference to the trial court." Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1393 (Utah 1996).
However, even an adverse determination on this issue has no import, and need not be
reached, if the court otherwise upholds the summary judgment ruling. On the other
hand, if the court were to vacate the Judgment and reinstate the Lis Pendens, it would
not have the effect desired by Plaintiff, because it would only affect unsold property.
Timm at 1394.
In Timm v. Dewsnup, the Supreme Court explained that the rule expressed in
Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1248, 1248 (Utah 1979), that an
unreleased lis pendens endures during pendency of the appeal without the necessity of
filing a supersedeas bond, is a rule that applies only to an unreleased lis pendens.
Timm at 1394. The Timm court ruled that where the lis pendens is released by order
of the trial court, the lis pendens will not endure appeal, unless the appellant makes a
successful motion to stay the trial court's order as provided by Rule 62(d), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure and Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In this case,
Plaintiff has failed to bring a motion to stay the Judgment, presumably because while
Plaintiff was happy to play the role of spoiler of Wilkinson's subdivision, he did not
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want to file the required supersedeas bond and thereby take the financial risk of failure
on appeal. Rule 62(d)
Given the Plaintiffs failure to file a motion to stay, even if the Lis Pendens is
reinstated in this case, as it was in Timm v. Dewsnup, any reinstatement would only
apply to subdivision lots purchased after reinstatement. Id. Those bona fide
purchasers who have already entered into sales contracts prior to any proposed
reinstatement, are not subject to the outcome of the litigation. Id. Given this reality,
if the court tampers with the City's land use decisions as requested by Plaintiff, the
result would be a checkerboard effect on subdivision lots, with some lots being subject
to the outcome of litigation, while other lots are not. The prospect of such a disparate
and undesirable land use outcome reinforces the wisdom behind the public policy of
affording tremendous deference to a governing body's land use decisions. Sandy City
v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482, 486-87 (Utah App. 1990).
V.

PLAINTIFF IS NOT PREJUDICED BY PERRY CITY COUNCIL'S
LAND USE DECISIONS.

Even if the court concludes that the City Council's rezone was illegal, Plaintiff
has to show prejudice from the illegality in order to prevail. Springville Citizens v.
City of Springville, 365 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 1999 Utah Lexis 28, 19 (Utah 1999) The
issue of lack of prejudice was raised at the trial court, when Wilkinson argued that
Plaintiff could not have been prejudiced by the decision made by the Council, since
Plaintiff had notice of all hearings and meetings, had opportunities to speak against the
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City's proposed decisions, and thereby exert a political influence on legislators. R.
144-45; Naylor v. Salt Lake City, 410 P.2d 764 (Utah 1966).
Plaintiff argues that he is prejudiced merely because he is an adjacent
landowner who will be adversely effected if nearby property is down-zoned.
However, this is not a valid prejudice issue because it is not based on the legality or
illegality of the City's actions. The prejudice Plaintiff alleges is based on Plaintiffs
disagreement with the City's political decision to allow the rezone, not on the alleged
procedural defects argued by Plaintiff on appeal. Indeed, had the City acted in the
procedural manner which Plaintiff now demands, the City would have come to the
same political decision regarding the rezone, as demonstrated below.
In Springville Citizens, the court required that "Plaintiffs must establish that
they were prejudiced by the City's noncompliance with its ordinances, or, in other
words, how, if at all, the City's decision would be different and what relief, if any,
they are entitled to as a result." Springville Citizens at 19. The difference between
Springville Citizens and this case, is that there is substantial record evidence for the
Appeals Court to uphold the trial court's decision based on lack of prejudice. There is
no need to wonder, speculate, or take evidence regarding what might have happened if
Wilkinson's property rezone was individually reviewed by the Planning Commissionbecause it was reviewed.
After Plaintiff brought suit against Wilkinson, Wilkinson determined that it was
prudent and less expensive to resubmit his individual rezone petition and thereby make
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Plaintiffs procedural arguments moot, rather than get bogged down in litigation. As a
result, Wilkinson submitted a rezone petition restating the provisions of the first
rezone, which was unanimously approved by the Planning Commission and City
Council. A copy of the Planning Commission's written approval is included in the
record at R. 170. Consistent with Plaintiffs pattern of delaying political decisions
through procedural pretexts, Plaintiff filed a new complaint against Perry City
regarding the second rezone, citing a new selection of procedural defects, thereby
preventing this matter from becoming moot.6 Wilkinson has no doubt that a third
rezone attempt would merely inspire a third lawsuit by Plaintiff. However, a third
rezone attempt would not make the Planning Commission's and City Council's intent
to approve Wilkinson's rezone any more clear than it is now.
In summary, regardless of the procedural pretexts raised by Plaintiff in his
second lawsuit, the Perry Planning Commission and City Council have unequivocally
answered the question of "how, if at all, the City's decision would be different" if
Wilkinson's rezone were reviewed by the Planning Commission and then voted upon
by the City Council. Springville Citizens at 19.

The clear answer is that its decision

wouldn't be different at all; both bodies have voiced clear approval of Wilkinson's
rezone. And, the power to rezone the Wilkinson Subdivision is within their political

6

The second lawsuit was filed in First District Court in and for Box Elder County,
Civil No. 980100718. See discussion at R. 166.
24

discretion. Thus, Plaintiff could not have been prejudiced by an alleged procedural
failure to remand for Planning Commission review.
CONCLUSION
Perry City and Wilkinson have provided substantial and compelling evidence
and argument that Perry City's zoning actions were reasonable and justifiable, and not
violative of any statute or ordinance. Furthermore, Perry City's ordinance is itself
invalid to the extent that it prohibits legislative action specifically granted by the
enabling statute. Plaintiff is jurisdictionally barred from claiming invalid subdivision
approval, for failure to meet the statutory 30-day appeal requirement. Furthermore,
Plaintiffs failure to bring a motion for stay would lead to objectionable and illconceived zoning results if Plaintiff were to succeed in its claim to overthrow the
City's land use decisions. Finally, the record evidence clearly demonstrates that
Plaintiff was not prejudiced by the City's actions, and therefore Plaintiff may not
prevail on its claims.
Based on the above, and the arguments set forth in Perry City's Appellate Brief
which are adopted herein by reference, Wilkinson respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the trial court's Judgment, and award Wilkinson his costs on appeal pursuant to
Rule 34(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DATED this 12th day of July, 1999
Gary R. Williams
Attorney for Appellee Brad Wilkinson
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STATEMENT REGARDING ADDENDUM
No addendum i£ necessary under Rule 24(a)(ll), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
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Attorney for Appellee Brad Wilkinson
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